SUMMARY

Much psychological and neuropsychological research on emotions simply assumes that some emotions are negative and others positive and that emotions such as love and hate are in some sense opposite. There is no theory, however, to explain why we should assign positive or negative values to particular emotional states, and even less to explain the commonplace that hate is the opposite of love. It has long been recognized that hate can arise in the place of love, but again, there is no theory to explain why this happens. The present study, consistent with microgenetic theory, attempts to comprehend the problem from a process-based approach. If we can understand why love can turn to hate and what happens when this occurs, we will at the same time have acquired significant insight into the workings of emotion and the age-old conflict between “head” and “heart.”

Key words: affect, microgenetic theory, self
LOVE AND HATE

The epigram quoted at the head of this article would appear upon first reading to be the most intense sort of spontaneous cry from the heart, the expression of a feeling that cannot be explained. Upon further analysis, however, the perspicacious reader will discover a verbal construction that belies the spontaneity, striking both for its cleverness and the depth of its perception (one suspects that Catullus himself, rather the Oscar Wilde of his day, would have been pleased by the former and embarrassed by the latter). The poem begins with the expression of a paradox: the simultaneous experience of two opposite emotions, hatred and love. The starkness of the paradox is all the more striking in the original, since the Latin language does not easily accept such “stripped down” sentences: it would have been more normal to say, in Latin even more so than in English, “I hate her, though I used to love her,” or “Even though I hate her, somehow I still love her,” or “Sometimes I hate her but sometimes I love her.” Instead, the sentence is reduced to two coordinate verbs linked by a simple “and,” a much rarer construction in Latin than in English, while the object of these two transitive verbs is omitted; most published translations into English add the “her” to make the first sentence more readable in English, but even in Latin the absence of an expressed object is distinctly odd.

At the end of the second line (which is the end of the poem), the Latin verb used to express pain and suffering means literally “to crucify.” Once again, the published translations almost always obscure the point of the poem by giving only the (presumed) transferative meaning of excrucior (“I suffer, I am in pain, I endure torment”) at the expense of the literal meaning (“I am crucified”). However, if we draw a line that connects the paradox at the beginning of the poem with the crucifixion at the end, and then connect the question (“why?”) to the answer (“I don’t know”), the result is an X – which in Catullus’ time was the most common form of cross used for the crucifixion of criminals. Hatred and love are pulling the poet with equal strength in two opposite directions, just as the arms of a crucified criminal are stretched in opposite directions. The point becomes even stronger when we consider that crucifixion was a penalty reserved for the worst sort of criminals, and was intended to inflict not only unbearable pain and suffering before death, but also public humiliation. The criminal was hung up in a public place, usually by the roadside, completely nude, and left to die a lingering death under the observation of passersby, who often stopped to taunt them, or, perhaps even worse, went on about their daily business completely indifferent. Thus, it would seem, the poet who hates and loves is dying, alone, exposed, his arms stretched out in opposite directions: hate and love.
The traditional interpretation of this poem is a biographical one. Catullus, it is thought, was having a love affair with an aristocratic woman, known in the poems by the pseudonym “Lesbia,” who was toy ing with him and had just rejected him. There are certainly other poems addressed to Lesbia, in which the poet expresses great love (for example, Carmina 5 and 7), and others in which he expresses rage, contempt and hatred towards her for having betrayed his love (58, 72); and even several (e.g. 75, 92) in which he seems to be saying that he cannot help loving her despite everything she has done to him. So it is tempting to put Carmen 85 in this last list, and leave it at that. Still, it is dangerous to approach a poem as though it were exactly what it appears to be, and even more dangerous to write a biography of the poet on the basis of such readings. The poem we are dealing with now contains no names, nor, as has already been remarked, is the object of the paradoxical emotions specified using even as much as a pronoun. The identity of the addressee, the “you” who may wish to ask why all this is going on is also not specified; indeed, there is no reason why the addressee could not be the person who is loved and hated. The poet seems to have gone out of his way to leave all this open, which is all the more remarkable in a poet who does not spare invective and is not afraid to name names.

The paradoxes do not end here. Catullus, who showed his appreciation of Sappho’s poetry by translating at least one of her poems into Latin, has always been read as a poet of feelings. He himself, however, aspired above all to the epithet doctus ‘learned’, and we have already seen the intricate craftsmanship with which he makes an apparent cri du coeur into a kind of verbal puzzle, whose solution is the real meaning of the poem. In the second line of the poem, then, the inability to resolve the paradox is immediately followed by the expression “I feel it happening”: cognition fails, but the feeling is unaffected and seems to require expression.

Examples could be multiplied, but for the present purposes all this discussion of a Latin poem by a Roman poet in a neuropsychological journal has served to introduce a series of important questions: Why do we assume that certain emotions are “opposite,” and what do we actually mean by that? In much of the recent psychological research on emotion, the idea that emotions have either a positive or a negative valence seems to taken for granted, so that little or no effort is expended to justify the assignment of “love” to the positive emotions and “hate” to the negative ones, even less to explaining why this is so. A simple hedonistic argument, that “positive” emotions make us feel good, while “negative” emotions make us feel bad, would be possible, though in some danger of being circular, but such arguments are seldom advanced. It would be possible, also, to advance a more stochastic model of emotions, even a kind of “cluster analysis,” without actually presenting any theory that would explain the relationship between one emotion and another, though it might seek to explain a given affect as a particular blending of two or more of the putative “primary” emotions. Even if this could be done, however, it would not explain the peculiar dialectic between hatred and love that Catullus expresses in this poem.

More commonly, love turns to hate. In a play by Pirandello, a man on his knees pleads for the love of a woman who rejects him. His pleas continue and she be-
comes contemptuous. Finally realizing that his entreaties are useless, he rises to his feet screaming, I hate you. This very plausible scenario, in which love suddenly transforms to hate, actually rage, implies a closeness or opposition of love and hate. Many love affairs are punctuated by fits of anger and bouts of remorse as in many of Catullus's other poems explicitly addressed to the fictional Lesbia (75, 92). It is likely that the lover in Pirandello's play would soon forget his hatred if he were embraced and reassured he is loved after all. Is the opposition in the domain of emotions like that, in the realm of meaning or perceptual experience, of life and death, night and day, black and white, or hot and cold? With drive-like behaviors one has oppositions such as hunger and satiety or fight and flight, but in the sphere of human emotion, why do we think oppositions are closer than neighboring items? Why does the mind attend to oppositions rather than gradations (see below)?

In these examples (and others, from literature and from life), the hatred is not motivated merely by the rejection, but reflects the lover's humiliation when a declaration of love and fealty is spurned or ridiculed. Probably, it is the humiliation that invites analysis more than the rejection, for the way the love is rejected influences the reaction. There are sufficient instances when a rejected lover becomes aggressive, even murderous, that we even accept such things as normal, and may even find reasons to excuse a "crime of passion." The emotions include a feeling of impotence in the situation, taking the disapproval of a beloved as tacit aggression towards oneself, i.e. if she doesn't love me, she hates me, so my hate is reciprocity or what she deserves. There are also feelings of loss or theft of a precious object, jealousy of course, the feeling "if I don't have her, no one else will", or rage at a person who, in their indifference, has shattered all hopes for the future.

Unrequited passion can lead to anger, but so can other provocations. Some people fly into a homicidal rage if they are accidentally bumped on the street, or if a car pulls in front of them. Intensity of feeling is not a sign of kinship, though it may signal a greater proximity to drive; if it were not so, incest would be a greater temptation for more of us, or at least would seem more "natural." The primary attribute of the beloved that inspires hatred is rejection or lack of reciprocity. With rejection, the self is not merely deprived of the added values of the beloved, but its own intrinsic valuations are diminished in the humiliation that rejection entails (Brown 2000). The lover is ready to give all to the beloved. When the beloved refuses the valuations of the lover, there is a feeling of unworthiness, and the self feels exposed for what the beloved thinks it to be (cf. Catullus hanging on his not-entirely-metaphorical cross). Ridicule is a means to humiliate. It is not the withdrawal of supplemental value from the other that incites hatred, but a threat to the core self when all it has to give is the object of disdain. If love arises from the urge to procreate, hatred must surely spring from the biologically conditioned urge to defend oneself against an enemy. But again, just as sexual drive is not enough to explain the phenomenon of love, so neither self-defense nor aggression is an adequate explanation for why one person comes to hate another – especially someone who is or was an object of love.
The response to rejection can range from justification to criticism to re-appraisal and greater self-knowledge, but also to rage and revenge. The effort to avoid the risk of dissolution is one of self-preservation. The indifference of the beloved is less threatening than a scornful reaction, which provokes hatred by undermining the lover’s self-image. When those values that account for self-identity are attacked or ridiculed, in clinging to its former identity, the self directs anger at whoever would dissolve the structure of the core (Pachalska 2002). The self can forego the assimilation of the beloved on realizing the lack of reciprocity, but it cannot easily ignore the repudiation of those values and beliefs by which it is constituted or defined.

We think of hate as bound to love even if reason tells us that the proper emotional reaction to rejection is sorrow, the natural affective consequence of loss, and not anger, which results from the feeling of being attacked. To some, of course, sorrow or melancholia is anger directed at the self, while hate transports anger outward to the source of the injury. Love and hate are blind to mitigating circumstance. This similarity leads to the idea that, lacking the passion requisite for either emotion, a person incapable of hating is incapable of loving. Love and hate can be – often are – obsessive. The individual is totally absorbed in the other who fills all thoughts and desires, whether in love or in anger, to the exclusion of all other people, even other activities. Revenge is the satisfaction of hate as union is of love. The one destroys, the other procreates. The Hindus understood well that there is one power, Shiva, for creation and destruction. The power to hurt or destroy replaces the feeling of powerlessness in love, especially, the disempowerment of rejection.

There is grief when a beloved who is part of the self is lost in death. When the beloved abandons the lover, mourning might also occur, even to the point of suicidal depression (again, for some, the ultimate self-anger). The death of the beloved leaves an objectless void for ideals that persist in the lover, but if the lover is deserted by choice, not circumstance, that is, by the free will of the beloved, there is an object, a person, to blame for the loss. In the sense that hatred for the beloved is hatred for the entrainment of the beloved in the core self, such hatred can be interpreted as anger at the self, or that part of the self the beloved represents. Mourning is then replaced by anger due to the injury of that portion of the self the beloved had become. In jealousy, the primary target of our anger may be the person who has “stolen” the love we think belongs to us, but this is almost invariably bound up with anger at the beloved, who has betrayed us. Betrayal has its place at the very bottom of Dante’s Inferno, precisely because betrayal forces us to revalue not only the present and the future (due to the loss), but the past, since it seems to mean that the love was false from the very beginning.

Love is bound up with the assimilation and idealization of the values of the beloved. Hate entails a negative valuation, and a belief – true or false – that the other has gravely wounded the self or someone or thing the self loves. How does an ideal of the beloved evaporate in hateful thoughts or impulses? What in hate corresponds to the ideal in love? We think of ideals as positive values. We would
say the good or truth is an ideal, but not evil or falsehood. Instead, a negative value is an idea that gathers affect in conflict with its opposite. We imagine that love is the opposite of hate, even in midst of hating, but not, in the act of loving, that its opposite could be hate. Yet when love dies, hate may fill the vacuum as unspent passion is channeled to anger by disdain.

Positive values or ideals tend to realize the forerunners of the percept-development, while negative ideas tend to realize those of the action-development. The object-development underlies the formation of categories and affective tonalities that assume a positive direction, while bias to the action-development tends to the opposite direction.

Naturally, action can serve to implement positive values while perceptual imagery can take a negative turn, with the most violent thoughts leading to aggression. Yet planned aggression is probably less common than plans governed by pleasure (Freud’s principle). Since self-pleasure is not necessarily at the other’s expense, especially in love and sexual desire, and since most people are not sadistic, imagery tends to dwell on the agreeable, even if it is for the benefit of the self. Imagery can represent a range of possibilities and conflicts denied to action that action must resolve. There is a definiteness and finality to aggression that contrasts with the scope and openness of pleasure, as in the contrast of bodily pain and physical pleasure. The natural course of the negative is into precursors of action, that of the positive into the antecedents of objects. Thoughts arise in

![Diagram](attachment:diagram.png)

**Fig. 1.** The unitary core fractionates to the main limbs of action and perception. Language production and perception are grafted onto this development. The action-development carries the self and body outward to the world to implement drives and desires. The percept-development deposits objects as aims. Generally, the action-development actualizes egocentric values, or values that realize self-interest. The percept-development actualizes objects as targets of self-interest but in its passive or receptive attitude conveys a feeling of self-denial in which the interests of the object (other) have priority over those of the self. This division is a bias that can shift in either direction.
the delay of action as imagery turns to a positive or negative aim, yet the negative is biased to action by instinctual aggression (Freud 1920/2009).

Thought is an abeyance of perceptual realization when visual or verbal (inner speech) imagery comes to the fore. Thinking can be rational or irrational; it can be recurrent and obsessive or creative and idiosyncratic in wish, daydream, reverie and fantasy. For the most part, the imagination is self-indulgent. Desires are sometimes clear, at other times disguised, but at all times offering pleasure to the self. The other may be a means to self-pleasure, but it is unusual for a wish to consist in tormenting someone, and the pleasures that others offer the self may be pleasurable for them as well. The seeking of pleasure entails the avoidance of pain, which in most people extends to others; only rarely does the pain of others give self-pleasure. When it does, and when infiltrated by personal grudge, it can be a breeding ground for hate, along with other images of violence. Does the pleasure of love in the imagination that contrasts with an image of inflicting pain underlie the polarity of love and hate?

The human mind seeks dichotomies where in nature there are mainly gradations. We concentrate on the extremes because the gradations are invisible. The mind settles on or creates an object or idea as a perceptual or logical solid, including emotional states. We see objects in motion, not a succession of objects constituting an event. We see objects changing, not events carved into a succession of similar objects. We speak of an emotion as a state, yet it is a fleeting experience that never recurs in exactly the same way. Every state is novel; inner and outer stabilities are artificial demarcations of flux. Unaware that flux is constitutive, or of the transitions in and out of states, we do not apprehend that whatever exists is in relation to what does not. The poet Mark Strand wrote, “in a field I am the absence of field… wherever I am, I am what is missing.” We are defined no less by what we are than what we are not. Heraclitus understood this; the famous quotation about not stepping twice into the same river actually reads, “We step and do not step into the same river, we are and we are not” (Fragment 49a). From this realization, and from the blindness to gradations, the idea of opposing states comes into mind.

How does love transform to hate? The rapid turn of love to hate and self-hate have been taken as signs of great love, while the psychoanalytic interpretation (Bergmann, 1987) is that passionate love is merely an interlude in a transition from melancholia to suicide. But a love that ends in hate need not eventuate in depression. And self-hate is not necessarily a consequence of hating someone else or losing someone you love. Perhaps the psychoanalytic concept of hate in relation to depression arises from the parallel observation that depression tends to be prevented by narcissism or self-love. This illustrates a problem for explanations of emotion in terms of contrasting states, while their micro-structure and the transitions from one state to another are obscure.

The path of gradually falling in love is from interest to passion. Hate would not seem to involve a series of states that is the reverse of falling in love, or it would go from passion, to affection, to interest, to displeasure, to annoyance, to anger
and then to hate. This may occur, but it is infrequent. Hate is not one pole in a spectrum with love at the other. Falling out of love ordinarily leads to friendship or indifference, not hate, which more often results from some adventitious event, such as a betrayal, a nasty divorce or, as in the example of Catullus and his Lesbia, a humiliating rejection. As Carmen 85 shows, the contrast can be abrupt, and in some cases both emotions can exist at the same time, difficult to untangle. One way to think of this phenomenon is to compare it to instinctual displacement. Lorenz (1971) and the ethologists have described how an impediment in the expression of one instinct results in the substitution of another, such as hunger displacing anger. It is not uncommon for soldiers in the midst of battle to suddenly fall asleep. Some have argued that love is a human instinct, or at least derived from instinctual attachments. More precisely, love is the elaboration in the imagination of a (?self-sacrificial) instinctual need for the other, e.g. maternal love and dependence, that serves to sustain affection over time. Hate is a similar elaboration in the imagination of a (?self-protective) need that serves to maintain instinctual aggression over time.

The direction of all feelings and the path through which they develop is from drive to desire. To speak of a scaling or staging of emotions is to mechanize this transition, while to link emotion to brain area or chemistry is to make claims as to the machinery. The transition is the same for all emotions, with the differing forms determined by the dominant phase (e.g. depth), context (e.g. concept, experience) and vector (e.g. approach, avoidance). On this view, the emotions follow a parallel path, with the contrasts between them either slight, e.g. shame and humiliation, or profound, e.g. mania and depression. In the former, we recognize continuum from one state to the other, so subtle that we may wonder if it is not just a logomachy. In the latter, the disparity is so great we concede opposition and take it as explanatory. But oppositional thinking occurs for emotions or concepts other than love and hate. For example, in depression the opposing state could be happiness or equanimity as well as mania. Aristotle’s “golden mean” thinking, where the virtue of courage is in the exact middle of opposing extremes, such as moderation between stinginess and extravagance, or courage between rashness and timidity, would not seem to hold in the case of love and hate, since otherwise we would make a virtue of indifference.

What exactly does it mean to say one emotion, love, is the opposite of another, hate? Why is love not an opposite to disinterest, indifference or the absence of love, which in the elimination of affection merely opens the door for hateful feelings? Freud thought indifference might also be conceived as an opposite to love and hate, and in addition, the contrast of giving and receiving love. Certain emotions tend to impede the arousal of others, e.g. love is impeded by anger, pride or apathy, but some emotions, such as interest or affection, prepare the way for love. If one feels hate, it is difficult to love, but so is it difficult if one feels envy or fear. A person who hates is also unhappy, but we do not contrast the two states. We can go from joy to grief as rapidly as from love to hate, say on hearing of a personal tragedy, but a rapid shift in state is not evidence of opposition. Indeed, the
intensity of grief on the loss of someone who is loved suggests that it, rather than hate, has greater validity as an opposition.

What in the imagination could tie love to hate? Emotions such as fear or envy that can replace affection are not in opposition to love. Fear can be as intense as any emotion. It is bound to an object, can develop rapidly and contrasts with anger or aggression, not love. Hate as extreme anger, or anger that persists (is revived) over time in the absence of an actual object, would be in opposition to fear, just as aggression is opposed to defense. The humiliation one endures for the sake of (justified by) love can lead to spite or hate when its justification is compromised or lacking. Aggression and defense are the outgoing and ingoing vectors of primal hunger, i.e. eat or be eaten, which transfers the same vectors to sexuality in pursuit and acquiescence, or domination and submission. The upshot is that the very concept of emotions in opposition, or even triangulated, is without foundation.

It seems obvious that affection is insufficient to prevent hate. Indeed, it is often preliminary to a hatred that is virulent. If, as the song (from Oscar Wilde’s poem) goes, “we always hurt the one we love,” this is not just by way of disappointment. We all see unloving couples who treat each other with scorn and abuse. They may no longer be in love but they would not fight with a stranger so terribly, and over such trivia, so there must be some residual feeling even if little more than dependency, an emptiness or the sadness of a love gone sour. It is not uncommon for such couples to resist the advice of outsiders that they should part ways, since neither party can imagine life without the other. We might say the union persists though the ideals that were its basis have long since faded. The bonds that keep loveless couples together are diverse - habit, fear of loneliness, economic - with little to do with love. There was once a British couple, married for thirty years, who played the lottery each week hoping to win enough money for a divorce!

Hate is for some object or thing that need not be present; in this respect it is intentional. It differs from rage, which is usually spontaneous and involuntary. Hate is conceptualized anger. We choose to hate, and may relish hateful feelings of revenge. But if mental states are determined, we should forgive those who hate us, for they do not act out of free will, and one should contemplate our own hatreds with the view that contemplation can mitigate the effect. But if we choose to hate, do we choose to fall in love? We can wish for love, or meet someone we hope to fall in love with, and though some writers have ascribed choice or judgment to love, true and passionate love is involuntary. The attempt to treat love as a judgment is valid when passion has faded and what remains is like friendship, where conscious choice plays a role. In true love we ignore or are oblivious to faults. Friendship is affection in spite of them. The attributes of a friend are valued; those of the beloved are idealized. The passion of love - whether it develops as a sudden flash or a gradual onset – will become intentional over time as lovers come to know each other.

Inevitably, passion fades. As the Italian writer Giuseppe Lampedusa wrote of his marriage, fire and flames for one year, ashes for thirty (fuoco e flamme per un anno, cenere per trenta). Love survives when it negotiates limitations that, if suc-
cessful, evolve to friendship. Or, love can go the way of disinterest, even contempt. The outcome depends on a weakening (objectification) of idealization, habit and complacency, or a failure to satisfy the other’s needs. The lover is now aware of incompatibilities that were previously obscured. When love dies, and is perceived as a loss, it transforms to grief or despondency. The manner of separation determines if ex-lovers remain friendly or are consumed by anger. This accompanies a greater detachment of subject and object. The beloved is no longer a categorical ideal in the imagination, that is, no longer a subjective pre-object, but is perceived like any object, fully objectified at the endpoint of the mental state. When the beloved is fully externalized, the intensity of a locus in the imagination shifts to a relatively affect-free locus in the world. The feeling that was concentrated in one object of value, and the internalization of the object to a phase of intense feeling, is now distributed over all objects, so the beloved is like any object in the field.

Hate usually lacks an erotic character. We can hate the policies of a president, but the opposite of such hate is not to love the policies but to approve of them. If hate is a strong form of disapproval, love is not a strong form of approval, for a strong approval of a policy would not be construed as love. We can strongly approve of certain people, teachers, acquaintances, without loving them. Approval in this sense is closer to respect. As with love, hate can be interpreted as an intentional attitude in relation to desire for an absent object. Unlike love, where reasons are invented even if the lovers admit the attraction is a mystery, justifications for hating are conscious and clear. If Bill hates John, it is because John has done something dreadful or refused to do something helpful. An immediate, visceral dislike of someone, for no apparent reason, occurs often enough, but this emotion can hardly be equated with hatred. The 17th-century English satirist Tom Brown (1662-1704) thus translated Martial’s Epigram I.33):

*I do not love thee, Dr Fell,*  
*The reason why I cannot tell;*  
*But this I know, and know full well,*  
*I do not love thee, Dr Fell.*

This famous epigram would hardly make sense if “I do not love thee” were to become “I hate thee.”

The reasons for hating may be senseless, say, in racial or religious hatred, but since hate, like love or other emotions, is not rational, it can be directed to almost any object. One says, I hate broccoli or shuffleboard, or I love squash or tennis, but this is just an emphatic way of saying that certain things or activities give pleasure or displeasure. The extension of meaning to such objects diverts attention from genuine love and converts feeling to an intentional attitude. Hate and love are not instincts but instinct-derivatives and distinctively human feelings. Animals show anger and the higher mammals exhibit something like affection, but for animals to hate or love implies the growth of conceptual feeling in the imagination and a judgment of outcomes, not merely choosing the most adaptive path. Animal be-
Behavior may be purposeful, like attachment, but it is instinctual, not intentional. To love someone is to wish to possess and be with that person. In hate, the wish is to see harm come to that person. The desire in love is to share or become one with the other; in hate, it is to destroy. Hate eradicates, love assimilates. Yet ironically, in both the object is dissolved, in one by absorption, in the other by annihilation.

Hate is anger at the object; love is desire for the object. Hate divides, love unites. The creative imagination in love and hate leaves the sphere of perceptual imagery and discharges in action. In love, the desire for proximity is the ground of sharing. In hate, the desire is to be rid of the other by distance or destruction. If the survival of the core is at stake, a threat to survival must be neutralized or eliminated. Individuals with a strong sense of self may be less vulnerable to the humiliation that is the basis of hate in unrequited love, but also less capable of passionate loving.

What is of interest in rejection is not the indifference of the other but the lover’s reaction. There are many reasons for rejection and many ways of managing it, some pro-active, others after the fact. To describe the forms, methods and bases of rejection is to recount a history of human experience. An individual may approach the other too forcefully or not forcefully enough. One may seek a lover where the disparity in appearance, culture or intelligence is too great or whose personal traits are unappealing. These can be ascribed to a lack of intuitive self-knowledge. The person is guided by conscious expectations out of sync with core proclivities. Often we are told who we should love, but most of the traits sought in a partner, or those instructed to a novice lover, are found in all cultures (Buss, 1994). Mate selection has a utilitarian quality, but not falling in love, which is why passion and marriage were long believed incompatible. For better or worse, so the oath goes, a person guided to someone by the unconscious beliefs and values of the core is, if the beloved reciprocates, more likely to find emotional release, even if the conditions are not suitable for a lasting union (MacQueen 2008).

MOURING

Like love, mourning is intensely focused on the beloved. In love, a thought of the beloved evokes joy; in mourning, sorrow. The loss of a beloved by abandonment can lead to mourning or, more often in men, anger. For psychoanalysis, the work of attaching and detaching libido (in love and loss) is similar. We do sense a similarity, but not in this respect. Ralph Greenson (1978) once remarked, in a discussion of similarities between weddings and funerals, that, in the former, one laughs on the outside, cries on the inside, while in the latter it is the reverse. This goes to the conflict or ambivalence of partial attitudes. We may affect grief in a gesture of propriety. There may be consequences of a death that are beneficial, such as freedom, an inheritance, and so on. Conversely, the “dark side” of marriage often looms before a couple on the threshold of a wedding. The couple falls in love for one set of “reasons,” commitment follows when other pressures are brought to bear, with marriage often the deathknell of the passion that bound the couple in the first place. Indeed, marriage can be a protracted mourning, or pen-
ience, for the gift of passion, just as grief purges the self of attributes of the other that are oppressive even if they are idealized. The romantic is the foil of the cynic, but the cynic never knows the joy of true love.

This raises the moral aspect of mourning, in that its intensity is taken as a sign of the sincerity of love, like the odalisques of the Inca who competed in shrieks and breast-beating for the most worthy of the consorts. This might lead one to simulate grief to fulfill the expectations of others or for their commendation. Mourning can become a moral obligation, like satisfying a dying wish. It is probably a necessary rite in every society. In the natural mourning of a beloved, when the love is deep and heartfelt, the lover must feel as if he or she has in some sense died as well, but mourning occurs when there is affection, for friends, even acquaintances, not just for a deep love. It also occurs for pets. One can mourn any loss that has particular meaning or significance for the self, a business, a possession, even the former self, the younger, happier, more agile version that passed away, literally, in becoming the self of the present. In contrast, the lack of mourning for a beloved, a wife, husband, close friend or relation, suggests an absence of emotion, insensitivity, insularity or self-absorption that vitiates the authenticity of whatever prior feelings may have existed. This leaves the question, what is the relation of love to loss, the fracture of genuine union to the pain of final separation?

The moral dimension extends to the extremes of sacrifice for someone who is loved. How deep and persistent is grieving before it is considered excessive or abnormal? Why is a morbid grief labeled a pathology? Is this derision for what others are unable to experience, or does it point to a deeper ambivalence? To die when the beloved is lost, or to compound death in suicide, the Romeo and Juliet syndrome, though scorned by cynics, is the final test of romantic love. The lack of a will to go on, or the wish to die, is almost obligatory if one is deprived of a love so powerful that its loss guarantees a life of despondency. A lover might die for the beloved, a parent for a child. Is not the willingness to die to save the life of one you love proof your love is real and that life without that person is worthless? If the beloved or child dies, what prevents the lover or parent from suicide? The fact that one would die to save a life, but not after the person has died, points to an asymmetry: in a suicide, to save a life forestalls a death, while after a death it compounds it.

What of occasions when a person dives into a river, not to save one’s own child, but a stranger? In a village in southern France, a child fell into the rapids and three strangers dove after her, all drowned. Such acts are signs of character and courage, not love. What of a man who watched in horror as his son sank on a sled into a hole in the ice? To dive into the water was almost certain death and would leave destitute a wife and several children at home. Where is the moral responsibility in such cases? Reason says the odds of success and survival are so slim as to make the act foolhardy. It is perhaps too easy for us to say that great love, say of a father for a son, should have led him to risk and probably lose his life in the attempt. The love was surely real, but the courage was lacking, and hesitation was justified by reason. In this instance, the father mourned his dead
son and no doubt grieved over his failure to act, even if it would have been an ir-
rationa, indeed fatal attempt (see discussion of moral conflict in Brown, 2005). If
courage leads a stranger to risk a life for someone, should not love do the same,
or give courage grounds for action? In a suicide or risk of death for love there is
a balance or competition among several feelings or attitudes: love and exocentric
feeling; prudence and egocentric feeling; and courage, with the dominance of one
facilitated or blocked by the others.

The loss or death of others affects us according to the degree to which their
idealization infiltrates or encumbers the self. In deep love, mourning is genuine
and prolonged, for it entails the gradual extraction of the beloved from the self-
concept. To the extent the beloved has become part of the lover’s (parent’s,
friend’s) self, the death of the loved one is the loss of that part of the beloved that
has grown into the self and become part of its nature. In true love, when the
beloved is so much a part of the self that the boundary of self and other dissolves,
the loss of the beloved is the self’s own death. To die of grief is the withering of
the self in the decay of its representation of the beloved.

There is a wide breadth of opinion on mourning. Some say prolonged mourning
is self-pity, or that a brief period of mourning is a sign of a healthy ego, or that the
life force presses to the future, or that replacing a beloved with new mate selection
is an evolutionary imperative. Were we to quantify the embodiment of the other in
the self, would we say the ideal is a self in which the other accounts for 50% of
qualities – the perfect match in the myth of Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium
– or that 80% points to a self that is weak and dependent, or that 20% suggests
too much autonomy or a superficial contact? Is it the case that thinking too much
about the past is morbid and against the grain of life? Some savor the memories
of a past love, and others press on to the next adventure. One might suppose the
inability or unwillingness to move ahead arises as much from fear or lack of con-
fidence or opportunity as an obsession with a past love. These are different kinds
of personality, one more inward than the other, not attitudes to judge or denigrate.
Normally, as one ages, the past looms larger in the imagination. Occasions of
pleasure are recalled, but also remorse and regrets. This is also a form of grieving,
over the errant self, the self one might have been, adventures missed, or the lost
possibilities in a life of compromise.

There is also the phenomenon of mourning a dead leader or celebrity who
might only be known through the news, a remote contact by radio or television.
The world-wide mourning of Princess Diana or Michael Jackson or Jack Kennedy
are examples. Such people are idealized as beautiful, brilliant, inspiring or cre-
ative. They would not be so mourned if they died of old age, but a premature death
deprees the people of further “contact” and benefit, raises the specter of their own
vulnerability and the possibility of early death. In mourning a celebrity, we see the
idealization of the other who in death assumes a greater share in those who grieve
than ever before in life. The attributes of the person, the charm, talent, leadership
and so on, replace the individual. The idealization shifts an external object to
a mental or categorical type.
Grieving can take many forms, and merges with depression, where the loss may not be a person but a home or a job, or it can be a melancholy that is endogenous. Here, it is not so much the loss of human valuations derived from others but an erosion of confidence and self-respect, a sense of failure, a loss of hope for success or a setback to striving and ambition. In all instances, it is a response to loss, and the response depends on the identification or dependence of the individual with the lost objects. Mourning is a form of depression, but the loss is that of a loved object, not the object world. In ordinary depression, the world is lost or has no interest for the individual. There is no fulcrum on which the depression turns. A person may seek to fix or locate depression in life events, but unless there is a specific loss, an accident or other happening, i.e. a reactive depression, no one event or combination of events incites the mood. In endogenous depression, there is a loss of interest in the world, an apathy or anhedonia, where the incitation is not apparent and the mood is attributed to neurochemistry. The loss of interest is a withdrawal of feeling from the world as a whole. In mourning, sadness decants to the loss of one person or thing as its source. That people grieve for pets even more than for family or friends introduces another dimension to mourning, namely, the strength of the self, its autonomy or dependence on the other, even an animal, and the loneliness that ensues when a “companion” is lost. To some extent, the pet must also be idealized, or it could easily be replaced by another animal.

Mourning in most instances requires an adaptation to a novel self in which idealized objects are held on to in the absence of their source. The beauty, generosity, love, attentiveness, values and beliefs of the other have grown into categorical ideals in the core self. The representation of the other in the self atrophies as feeling slowly returns to self-valuation, and autonomy replaces fusion or dependence. However, often enough, in the absence of objective data, when there are no grounds for invalidation, the ideal of the other – lover, parent, friend – continues to flourish, indeed grows stronger. Ideals cannot objectify into lost objects, so they can remain behind in the imagination as qualities of perfection.

JEALOUSY

From an evolutionary standpoint, jealousy is presumed to be part of the instinctual repertoire that helps to safeguard paternity for males and, for females, serves to ensure protection and assistance in child-rearing (Buss, 1994). Whether jealousy is an instinctual reaction that is programmed in the genome or, more likely, a derivation of egocentric feeling influenced by culture and personal experience, is an open question. The problem with simple correlations based on evolution is that the absence of jealousy could be explained on the same basis, namely as liberating the male for wider copulation and the female for wider mate selection. If exclusivity and infidelity can be interpreted by contrasting interpretations of the same adaptive pressures, both interpretations are unsatisfactory. Among animals there is a competition among males for access to females, which works for the
selection of advantageous features. If this were transferred to humans, strength and intelligence in males would be favored in selection, males would be polygamous and females would accept, not contest, this evolutionary pattern. The argument is that there is no benefit to the male to remain with one female after reproductive success unless his access to other females is limited. Similarly, one could argue an advantage to the female of multiple encounters with higher males that outweighs the benefits of protection or support. A problem for the standard evolutionary account is the existence of primitive cultures, such as Aborigine, in which insemination is not linked to pregnancy, when the quickening begins some months later.

Regardless of its utility or adaptive value, the feeling of jealousy and its psychic structure are similar in men and women, with slight though not unimportant biases. These include the tendency, in men, for greater discomfort over sexual infidelity, while for women an infidelity that involves a transfer of affection tends to trump casual sex. If men are less faithful than women, that may reflect a difference in libido, opportunity, egocentricity or risk-taking. The ability of many men to limit their infidelity to a purely sexual engagement without emotional intensity allows them to encapsulate the activity in states of objectified action that is relatively affect-free. Perhaps for this reason, men are more vindictive for sexual indiscretion in women than emotional reallocation, while women are more forgiving for sexual dalliance, but not an affair of the heart.

Jealousy is both simple and complex: simple, in that it is common and near universal, even interpreted as a sign of love, and complex, in that it entails a mix of feelings alien to the spirit of love, such as selfishness, possessiveness, anger and resentment. Since jealousy can be a source of rage, it touches the category of hate. Yet, in the broader sense, a person might be jealous of a partner’s enthusiasm for a hobby, travel, pets, a career, all of which can deprive the partner of intimacy and engagement and threaten the stability of the union.

Moreover, there is a relation to envy, which is the feeling one should have what others have or be in their place, often tinged with anger at privation of things belonging to others that are undeserved, or that the envious person merits more than those who are envied. In ordinary speech, the terms can sometimes be interchangeable, e.g. I am jealous (envious) of their good luck or happiness. When used in this sense, jealousy is not related to the union of lovers. Nor is jealousy, as usually believed, so closely related to the fear of losing the other, since it occurs in people who have just met or those tightly bonded. Jealousy can flair up with an innocent flirtation by a casual acquaintance by the imagined preference for another, even a character in a novel, when an implicit comparison is felt and it is unflattering (Pachalska & MacQueen 2008).

More likely, the intrusion into a couple of another person or pursuit is taken as a sign of disinterest, lack of valuation, an injury to self-esteem and a repudiation of giving and commitment. In true love, the beloved fills the lover’s thoughts and attention. When attention is diverted, questions arise as to the authenticity of feeling. Yet the person who is jealous displays narcissism or an egocentric attitude
that is contrary to the spirit of love, when the demand for union and exclusivity replaces a desire for it. To insist on fidelity is like insisting on love, which once freely given must now be enforced.

**JEALOUSY AND ENVY**

Envy is the over-valuation of an object in the possession of someone for whom there is some degree of proximity in time and space (we do not usually feel envious of people we do not know personally, or at least see in person). Like jealousy, which is for a person, envy is specific to an object, in the wider sense, belonging to another person. One does not envy a museum for its wealth or collections, but rather, an acquaintance whose goods are such that they are desired by the self. One is jealous of a person who threatens to steal the interests or affections of a partner, but envy is for the goods of that person. Both are directed to the other or his or her goods, and both refer as well to the self, which is found wanting, in affection or in goods. Either emotion can consume a person and lead to anger, which can be directed outward at the other as a source of distress, or inward to the self in suffering and/or privation.

Both envy and jealousy erode – or manifest a lack of – self-confidence. The individual feels inadequate or of insufficient value. These emotional attitudes are interpreted in terms of the constitution of the self in relation to others or their goods. They are also variations on desire, in one, for a lover we are in danger of losing, in the other for the goods of the other that cannot be possessed. These are not so much different emotions, but different relations of self, other and desire that color feelings which appear to be distinct affective states. More precisely, envy and jealousy are biases in the desire for a beloved or for goods that are in danger of being lost or cannot be satisfied in a self that, like most selves, is incomplete or unfulfilled.

Jealousy for a competitor can become envy at his or her gifts, as envy can turn to jealousy when the self fears the loss of a beloved, when objects of envy for the lover become objects of desire for the one who is loved. If the self desires the goods of the other, this is not love but acquisitiveness or betrayal. The qualities of personality or character that are objects of desire are inseparable from the person with those qualities that is the basis of love, not “properties” that can be cleaved from the other, such as wealth. In this way, love can be infected by cupidity, when the individual desires a person not for the properties of their character, but for the character of their properties. Thus, the state is shaped by the self (strong, weak) that desires the object (person, goods) of the desire and impediments (others, self-limitations) in the satisfaction of the desire. According to the mix of these factors, we designate the emotion as envy, jealousy, acquisitiveness, greed, frustration or anger.

**PARENTAL LOVE**

Some exploration of the attachment of mother and infant is necessary, as it may well be the archetypal form of subsequent modes of loving. While there are
obvious exceptions, most mothers and many fathers feel a devotion to their infant that defies rational explanation. In infancy, apart from the instinctual bonds and rhythms of mother-baby interaction, there is no definite language, little communication, scant personality and scarce reciprocity, all of which are essential to mature love. The infant is barely distinguishable from others of its general type and gender, but inspires such adoration as to be, for the mother, more precious often than the father or even her own life, which she surrenders in large part for the care of a total dependency whose smile and gurgle are the sum reward for her efforts.

What is striking about parental love in its optimal state is its asymmetry. The unconditional self-sacrifice and selfless devotion given to the infant are infrequent in adult relationships, where it would likely be viewed as masochistic and abnormal. If one asks new parents why they love the baby, they would probably say to the effect, he or she is so cute, adorable, clever – as if they had won the baby-jackpot - but the truth is they have no clear idea why the baby is so loved, nor a rational account of the sacrifice involved in caring for the child, with every reason given serving for a justification of all others, except for the innate attachment-feeling that itself is inexplicable.

**CONCLUSION**

It is no easy task to subject emotions as powerful as love and hate to critical, rational scrutiny. It is easier and far more common either to ignore, bracket, or marginalize emotions, so as to concentrate on cognitive processes that can be mapped and described with greater precision, or to adopt the poet’s strategy: “I don’t know, but I feel it happening.” We are still working with a kind of theoretical void in the area of emotion and feeling, left over from the great intellectual battles of the past (psychology against philosophy, behaviorism against psychoanalysis), the result of which has been to discredit old theories without replacing them. The present article can hardly claim to have filled this void, but the microgenetic theory upon which it is based gives, in our opinion, a coherent account of the relationship between feeling and thought. The relationship between the experiencing (feeling, thinking) subject and the objects of drive, desire, emotion or thought is a single process composed of several qualitatively distinct evolutionary phases, each of which is submerged, but not lost, when the next appears on the surface.

Love and hate are obviously both conditions of the subject-object relationship, which means that they are implicit in both conscious and unconscious mechanisms of behavior. Their opposition, or perhaps dialectic, arises from differences in object valuation that begin at (but cannot be reduced to) the drive level. As elsewhere argued (Brown 2005), valuation is an implicit part of every mental process, and not merely the result of a second-pass process based on inculcated social values. It is our conviction that only a process-oriented approach can satisfactorily explain the complex relationship between “head” and “heart,” which has been at the core of literary and philosophical dialogue in Western culture (and not only) from the very beginning.
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